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Article 6

Legislative Abrogation of Immunities
Under Section 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territoy, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitutionand laws, shallbe liable to the party injured in any
action at law, suit in equity, or other properproceedingfor redress.1

I. Introduction
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has survived a rocky history of
dormance, 2 expansion, 3 contraction, 4 and reexpansion. 5 Despite this history,
the statute today plays an important role in the private enforcement of civil
rights. 6 Section 1983, however, has not been able to reach its full potential as a
civil rights statute. Individuals' civil rights continue to be violated 7 under color
of state law, and section 1983 has often failed to provide an adequate remedy.8
One factor which has kept section 1983 from becoming a truly effective civil
rights tool has been the immunities granted under the statute.
During its 108-year existence, the application of section 1983 has been
controlled largely by judicial interpretations of its legislative history and pur-

l 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976).
2 The broad, sweeping language of S 1983 allowed courts large amounts of discretion in its interpretation. Court interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, which was the source of both the statute and S
1983, took most of the vigor from the protective language. See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S.
430 (1904) (act must be authorized by state law to be state action), overruledin United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17 (1960); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (limited the rights of the fourteenth
amendment to those rights correlative to the existence of national government). See Gressman, The Unhappy
History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
3 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 364 U.S. 167 (1961) (under color of state law in civil context includes
misuse of power; federal remedy is supplemental to state remedy; specific intent to deprive a citizen of a
federal right need not be shown); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (criminal counterpart of 5
1983, now 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (1976), interpreted to include misuse of power); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939).
4 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (injunctive relief limited by concerns of federalism and
comity); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Younger abstention applied to S 1983 action). See
Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 49
(1976); Comment, Section 1983, the Eleventh Amendment, and General Principles of Tort Immunities and Defenses:
Who is Left to Sue?, 45 U. Mo. K.C.L. 29 (1976).
5 See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ("person" includes local
governing bodies where the act consists of unconstitutional implementation or execution of a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, decision, or custom which represents official policy).
6 Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977: Hearingson S. 35 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciary,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977-1978) (citing Sen. Mathias, 123 CONG. REC. S201 (daily
ed. Jan. 10, 1977)) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
7 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supranote 6, at 135 (testimony of Louis Nunez, Acting Staff Director, U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights); Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedyfor Law Enforcers'Misconduct,87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978); The Metcalfe Report on the Misuse of PoliceAuthority in Chicago, CHICAGO DEFENDER, July 1973, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 216.
8 "Currently, 51983 is neither an effective deterrent to police misconduct nor an effective remedy to
the victims of police abuse." Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 142 (prepared statement of Louis Nunez,
Acting Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
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pose. The statute, however, is subject to congressional control and change. 9
Congress is currently studying various amendments to section 1983, with the
Civil Rights Improvements Act of 197710 (Civil Rights Bill or Bill) as the prototype. Although the Civil Rights Bill did not receive congressional approval, it
was the subject of congressional hearings" and received attention in the legal
community. 12
The purpose of this note is to focus on the governmental and official immunities of section 1983 with a prospective view toward their codification or
change. The Civil Rights Bill will be used as a starting point for analysis. Two
broad issues will be examined: 1) to what extent should governmental immunity be granted under section 1983, if at all; and 2) to what extent should official
immunity be granted under section 1983, if at all. 3 Governmental immunity,
in this context, refers to that immunity granted a state, municipality or other
unit of government. Official immunity refers to the insulation from liability of
any human agent of a state or local government entity. Officers include police,
judges, prosecutors, and other state and local agents.
II. Immunities Under Section 1983
Immunity as a generic term describes the protection of an individual or
entity from legal liability. 1 4 The broad language of section 1983, on its face, imposes liability on "every person" who "under color of" state law subjects
"any citizen" to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]."1 5 A literal interpretation of section 1983 would subject anyone who violated an individual's
protected rights under color of state law to liability. The absolute liability standard suggested by the language, however, has been rejected. 16 In lieu of a
literal interpretation of the statute, immunities have been incorporated into
section 1983 by way of two independent routes: judicial definition of statutory
language and the incorporation of common law principles.
9 "With few exceptions, the Supreme Court decisions ... have been based on the Court's interpretation of section 1983, a statute that Congress wrote and that Congress is empowered to change." Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
10 S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REG. S201-05 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), amended and reintroduced Amend. No. 1426, 123 CONG. REc. S16,560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
Several House versions ofS. 35 were also introduced. See H.R. 7520, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REc. H5257 (daily ed. June 1, 1977); H.R. 6151, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. H3181 (daily ed.
Apr. 6, 1977); H.R. 5535, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H2547 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1977); H.R.
4514, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H1756 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1977); H.R. 549, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H195 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977).
A slightly amended version of S. 35 is being studied. Some form of the bill will be reintroduced in the
96th Congress.
11 Senate Hearings, supra note 6 (hearings held Feb. 8-9, 1978, and May 2-3, 1978).
12 See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. ofSocial Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 719 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of MunicipalLiability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP.
L.Q. 409 (1978).
13 Questions of the liability of individual government agents also include the issue of to what extent the
immunity of an individual official should be extended to the governmental unit, if at all.
14 "Immunity does not mean that no acts in fact were done, but that there may be no prosecution in
respect thereto. Immunity does not wipe out the history of events." United States v. Swift, 186 F. 1002,
1017 (N.D. Ill. 1911). W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971).
15 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976).
16 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The most prominent example of the creation of an immunity by definition
occurred in Monroe v. Pape17, when the Supreme Court held that a municipality
was not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. This interpretation
resulted in complete exclusion of municipalities from liability.' 8 In Monell v.
New York City Department of Social Services, 19 the Court reversed its prior stance
and reinterpreted the definition of "person" to include a municipality in narrowly defined circumstances. The expansion of the definition of "person" in
Monell resulted in a qualified immunity for municipalities.
Immunities have also been achieved by the incorporation of common law
concepts into section 1983. Courts have refused to interpret the broad language
of section 1983 as abrogating the legal tradition of immunity for public
officials. 20 As a result, section 1983 is "read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. "21 Common law immunities arise when a court determines that certain
policy considerations require insulation of an individual or entity from exposure to suit. 22 Such immunities include absolute protection from suit, 23 affir25
mative defenses of good faith, 24 and subtle shifts in burdens of proof.
Although immunity by definition and immunity by common law have different conceptual foundations, the effect, in either case, is a limitation of
remedy for the plaintiff. For this reason a prospective analysis of the extent to
which immunity will be granted under section 1983 requires resolution of the
competing interests of the individual alleging a constitutional harm and the
government or its agent claiming the need for immunity. This balancing approach is not susceptible to a mechanical resolution, but necessarily involves
policy decisions and value judgments. Such a balancing of interests, whether
by the judiciary or Congress, requires an understanding of the policies behind
immunity and of the purposes of section 1983.
A. Justificationfor Immunity
Immunity for government officials and government entities stems from
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. The original justification for

17 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18 The exclusion of the federal government and federal officials from the purview of S 1983 in effect
gives immunity to the federal government by its omission. The advisability of extending § 1983 to the
federal government will not be discussed in this note. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971); Newman, supra note 7, at 456.
19 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
20 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Francis v.
Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1954); McCormack & Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section
1983, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 65 (1976).

21 365 U.S. at 187. See Nahmod, Section 1983 andthe "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974).
22 See text accompanying notes 26-38 infra.
23 See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges absolutely immune from suit); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors in their quasi-judicial role are absolutely immune from suit).
24 See, e.g., Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 344 (10th Cir. 1973)
(en banc), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
25 Some courts have found immunity to be a defense, see, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53
(3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Other courts have placed the burden on the plaintiff to plead and prove
malice. Hammeman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1976). See Freed, Executive Official Immunity for
Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. REv. 526, 562 (1977).
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immunity was that the King was incapable of wrongdoing, a rationale which
has since been rejected. 27 Courts, however, have continued to apply the doctrine on public policy grounds.2 8
The primary reason given by modern courts for granting immunities is
that the fear of liability will reduce the effectiveness of government entities and
their agents by discouraging aggressive performance of duties. 29 Timid performance of public duties, however, will depend upon whether both the
government-employer and the employee are exposed to liability and upon the
amount of discretion exercised by the government employee. If liability is
borne by the employer, the employee-officer is not likely to be inhibited in the
vigorous performance of public duties.30 The government is capable of action
only through its officers, 31 therefore, reluctant performance of public duties
due to fear of liability appears less probable when the individual agent will not
be liable. Fear of liability by the government-employer, rather, would be
reflected in the official policy of the government. In addition, the claim that the
prospect of liability confines the actions of the government entity must be considered in light of the countervailing desire for government restraint when its
3 2
activities threaten constitutional rights.
Even if the fear of liability discourages the aggressive performance of
duties, the impact is not as great when little discretion is provided to the officer
involved. The nature of the officer's duties will affect the range of choices, and
therefore the amount of discretion to be exercised. For example, a police officer
has the discretion to give a verbal warning or to arrest an individual. The
prosecutor has a wider range of choices: the decisions of whether to prosecute,
drop charges or plea bargain. Therefore, when the prosecutor holds back on
aggressive performance of his duties the impact is greater.3 3 When examining
whether fear of liability will cause timidity of action, the amount of discretion
exercised by the officer becomes an important factor.
A second justification given for the immunity of officials and government
entities is that it will prevent harassment and vexatious litigation. 3 4 Although it
is true that litigation is time-consuming and may be used for harassment, this is
an unfortunate element of all lawsuits. Unless absolute immunity were
26 416 U.S. at 239; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
27 See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (10th ed. 1887); K. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 5 25.00
(1958); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209 (1963).
28 See Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1295-96 (1953); Comment,
Accountabilityfor Government Misconduct: Limiting Qualified Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L.Q.

938, 940-41 (1976).
29 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365-66 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). In Mashaw,
Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 8,
26-28 (1978), Professor Mashaw notes that this rationale includes two assumptions: 1) certain activity would
be more discouraged by damages for an act of commission than for omission, and 2) civil liability would
result in defensive activity by the officials charged.
30 Jaffe, supra note 27, at 216; Note, Sovereign Immunity-Scheur v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section 1983
Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REV. 439, 447 (1974).
31 See Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("all municipal actions are
performed for the municipality by its human agents"). Any government entity, whether the state or its
political subdivision, can only act through its employees.
32 See Freed, supra note 25, at 564.
33 See Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
34 Kates & Kooba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
131,142-46 (1972); Mashaw, supra note 29, at 28-29.
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granted, only the elimination of section 1983 could completely protect officials
from the dangers of unfounded charges.
Third, it is argued that the imposition of liability on government units will
result in an excessive and unbearable financial burden. The validity of this
argument is suspect for two reasons. First, the trend toward abandonment of
state sovereign immunity for torts 35 has not resulted in unbearable liability for
the entities involved. 36 Second, because many state and local governments are
now liable for common law torts, it is difficult to justify on financial grounds
why those entities should not also be liable for violations of constitutional
37
rights.
In addition to the concerns of financial burdens on the government entity,
the prospect of personal liability by individual agents may discourage qualified
applicants from seeking governmental employment. Fear of personal liability
by officers of the government, however, is dependent upon whether the agent
carries insurance, whether an indemnity agreement exists between the agent
and the government entity, and whether the government will also be liable in
an action for damages. The existence of these factors would appear-to mitigate
the seriousness of a reduced government applicant pool.
Individual and governmental immunities have not been considered
analytically related under the current judicial interpretations of section 1983,
in part because of the separate origins of definitional immunity and common
law immunity. When a person is definitionally excluded from application of
section 1983, courts need not examine the policy reasons for immunity because
Congress has presumably made the choice to protect the individual from liability. When, however, the immunity is based on the common law, a court must
find a policy justification for use of the doctrine. Now that Congress has the opportunity to reexamine section 1983, it should realize that the related lines of
justification for both individual and governmental immunity under section
3 8
1983 require that they be considered and analyzed together.
35 See note 71 infra.
36 W. Prosser, supra note 14, § 131; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:A Decade of Change, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 919, 921 & n. 18, 969-78 (1966); Comment, The State As a Party Defendant:Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Tort in Maryland, 36 MD. L. REv. 653, 661-63 (1977).
37 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 112 (testimony of Charles A. Barrett, Chief Deputy Attorney General
of California, representing the National Association of Attorney Generals):
SENATOR METZENBAUM: Didn't you tell the truck driver who drives your garbage
truck not to drink while he's on the job? Didn't you tell each of your employees not to drive their
automobiles recklessly? And don't you accept responsibility when they transgress those rules?
How do you make that distinction?
You say you know that you have told them not to do these things. I'm not always certain that
you have - that every muncipality has - done that, and that every public body has done it;
because I'm not sure that the emphasis on the protection of constitutional rights is always this
great.
But assuming that you have, again, how do you make the distinction that you have told them
not to drive while intoxicated and they do it and you pay the damages. Why shouldn't you pay
the damages when you violate a constitutional right?
MR. BARRETT: It's a hard distinction to make. I will certainly concede that, Senator.
But I still think that the persons in the community should not be forced to pay that on behalf
of the person who is violating the law and violating someone's rights.
The person should be forced to pay that - the defendant himself - and not the entity that
employs him.
38 See Baxter, EnterpriseLiability, Publicand Private, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 45, 47-48 (1978): "Only
the conjunction of official immunity with sovereign immunity can lead us into any confident conclusion
about the social desirability of the official immunity rule ......
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B. Purposes of Section 1983: Their Effect on Remedy
Section 1983 has been interpreted as both a compensatory and deterrent
device. 39 With the opportunity to amend the statute, Congress may now
reevaluate the manner in which these goals are to be met and the emphasis to
be accorded compensation and deterrence.
Because constitutional rights continue to be violated, the need for a more
effective remedy continues. If constitutional rights are more important than
other rights, absent other considerations dealt with in this note, the remedy for
constitutional violations should be at least as broad as that given for nonconstitutional violations. 40 Both the form and the breadth of the strengthened
remedy will depend upon how the remedy achieves the acknowledged purposes
of compensation and deterrence.
It is possible to achieve deterrence without compensation. For example, if
deterrence were the paramount purpose of section 1983, a bifurcated remedial
system would be appropriate: individuals and entities would be immune from
damage actions, but subject to injunctions. 4' Conversely, if compensation were
the predominant goal of section 1983, there would be little reason to subject individuals and entities to injunctive suits. But the goals of compensation and
deterrence are not mutually exclusive and there is no reason for Congress to
prefer or exclude either when dealing with section 1983.
With an understanding of the justifications for immunity, the dual purpose of section 1983 and the link between these purposes and the remedies to be
allowed, it is now possible to examine governmental and official immunity
under section 1983.
III. Governmental Liability
A. Current Law
During the growth of section 1983 as a functional civil rights statute, the
word "person" had been construed to exclude a state 42 or municipality.4 3 In
39 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 171-87; Newman, supra note 7.
40 In the private sector damages have served to compensate the individuals harmed, while both
damages and injunctions have been effective deterrents against unlawful conduct. See Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
41 Bifurcation of the nonperson interpretation of Monroe was rejected in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U.S. 507, 513 (1973). Justice Rehnquist reasoned: "We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in
Monroe, or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the generic word 'person' in § 1983
was intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the
relief sought against them." Monell does not change the conclusion reached in City of Kenosha. 436 U.S. at
701 n.66.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974),
held that the eleventh amendment immunity was not abrogated by § 1983, notwithstanding consent by a
state to suit in its own courts. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976), indicated that Congress has the power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to override
the eleventh amendment. Doubt as to the vitality of Edelman after the 1978 Monell decision, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), was relieved in Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979), where the Supreme
Court stated that Monell does not affect the Edelman decision. In order to hold a state liable under § 1983,
Congress will have to demonstrate a clear congressional purpose to abrogate the eleventh amendment.
43 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

NOTES
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1978, however, the Supreme Court held in Monell v. New York City Departmentof
Social Services44 that "[]ocal governing bodies... can be sued directly under §
1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers.' 45 Under Monell, unconstitutional action pursuant to
custom would subject a municipality to liability even if it did not have formal
approval. 46 The Supreme Court further indicated that a municipality could not
be held liable solely on the basis of respondeat superior, but did not expound on
47
what would be sufficient to hold a municipality liable.
Monell left the "full contours ' 48 of municipal immunity unexamined. It
was left to later cases to determine whether some sort of qualified immunity
would be available to protect municipalities and to delineate what factors in ad49
dition to the employer-employee relationship would give rise to liability.
Monell exposed municipalities to suit under section 1983 to a limited degree. Its
ultimate impact, however, will be determined by the treatment it receives by
50
the lower courts.
B. Legislative Reform
1. Need for Legislative Action
Although Monell was a major breakthrough in expanding remedies under
section 1983, state and municipal liability under the statute remains a likely
subject of congressional review for three reasons. First, the history of section
1983 demonstrates that it has been subject to an uneven interpretation by the
courts. 51 Unless Congress is willing to leave the many questions of governmental liability to the judiciary, it should act to expand, clarify or codify the desired
rules under section 1983. Second, Monell specifically left open the possibility
that some kind of municipal immunity might obtain under section 1983.52 This
possibility could result in emasculating many of the breakthroughs made possible by Monell. Finally, state immunity under the eleventh amendment can be
abrogated only by specific congressional authorization. 53 For these three
reasons, changes in governmental or official immunity should come through
legislation.

44 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
45 Id. at 690.
46 Id. at 690-91.
47 Id. at 691.
48 Id. at 695.
49 Id. at 701. See Note, Monell v. Department of Social Services: The Emergence of Municipal Liability
Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, 8 CAp. L. REv. 103 (1978).
50 Blum, supra note 12. The post-Monel decisions indicate that Monell might not significantly increase
the remedy for § 1983 plaintiffs. See, e.g., Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978) (municipality
not liable for injury inflicted by police officer); Reimer v. Short, 578 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1978) (municipality
not liable where police officer exceeded authority).
51 See notes 2-5 supra.
52 436 U.S. at 701.
53 See note 42 supra.
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2. Legislation
The 95th Congress considered expansion of governmental liability under
section 1983 in the Civil Rights Bill. 54 The Bill would have retained the current
version of section 1983, but would have expanded and defined its scope. It
called, in part, for expansion of the definition of "person" to include:
any natural person, any association or combination of natural persons, any
partnership, corporation, or other legal entity, any State or territory, any
municipality, county, parish, or other State, territorial, or local governmental
subdivision, unit or agency, the District of Columbia, or any agency of the
District 5of Columbia; and "State or territory" shall include the District of Columbia.
The Bill further made states, municipalities or their subdivisions or agencies
liable for damages under section 1983 when any officer, agent or employee or
other person clothed with governmental authority was involved in any of the
following four specific circumstances: 1) when such person's conduct was
authorized or required by statute, ordinance, policy or practice, or when performed by the person who was responsible for making the policy; 2) when such
person acted at the direction, or with the encouragement of a supervisory officer; 3) when a supervisory officer, with authority to act, knew or should have
known that a subordinate had previously engaged in such conduct and failed to
halt or take reasonable steps to prevent the conduct; or 4) when the person
seeking relief could not identify
the particular officer or agent who inflicted the
5 6
wrong, or prove causation.
In contrast to the limitation of damage liability, the Bill authorized injunctive relief against the state, municipality, subdivision or agency whenever any
agent violated the provisions of section 1983. The Bill directed, in mandatory
language, that the federal court "shall" order disciplinary or other remedial
measures 57
C. Critique
1. Comparison of Current Law with the Legislation
The Civil Rights Bill was introduced prior to Monell. Of the four
delineated circumstances in which a state or municipality would have been
liable under the Bill, Monell specifically reaches only the first: conduct authorized or required by statute, ordinance, policy or practice. 58 In certain circumstances, however, Monell might be interpreted to include instances when,
54 S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S201-05 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), amended and reintroduced Amend. No. 1426, 123 CONG. REC. S16,560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
55 Id. S 2(b).

56 Id. S 2(c)(1).
57 Id. S 2(c)(2).
58

See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
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as stated in the second provision for entity liability, a person acted at the direction or with the encouragement of a supervisory officer. 59
The third circumstance in the Bill in which a state or municipality would
have been held liable was designed to remedy the type of situation which existed in Rizzo v. Goode.60 In Rizzo, section 1983 injunctive relief was denied,
despite some indications of a pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police
misconduct. The decision was justified, in part, because no affirmative misconduct was shown by the supervisory authorities. 61 Monell, unlike the Bill, would
not appear to reach a Rizzo situation unless a municipal custom could be
62
shown.
The fourth instance in which a municipality would have been exposed to
damages under the proposed legislation was in situations when a constitutional
deprivation had occurred, but the specific wrongdoer could not be identified.
The impetus for this provision was Burton v. Waller.63 In Burton, several Jackson
State college students who had survived a police confrontation brought an action under section 1983. No recovery was allowed, despite a finding of use of
excessive force, because the plaintiffs were unable to identify the individual
wrongdoers. In Burton, a remedy would be available only if the employer accepted responsibility simply on the basis of the employer-employee relationship. This, in turn, results in a respondeat superior standard being used to hold
the entity liable. Monell, however, indicates that a municipality is not liable
"solely because it employs a tortfeasor. '64 The Bill, in contrast, would have
provided a remedy in a Burton situation.
Monell is consistent with the holding in City of Kenosha v. Bruno65 that section 1983 makes no distinction between damages and injunctive relief. The
Bill, however, would have treated the two remedies differently. Under the Civil
Rights Bill damages would have been awarded only in the four circumstances
described above, while equitable relief would have been given whenever a per66
son clothed with the authority of the state engaged in prohibited conduct.
59 A high-level supervisory officer who encourages illegal conduct for purely personal motives might not
be held liable under Monl because no municipal policy or custom is involved. If the same supervisor encourages the same action under tacit approval of the government entity or pursuant to custom, Monell would
appear to hold the municipality liable.
60 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
61 The requirement of affirmative misconduct applies to damage actions under § 1983, as well as to requests for injunctive relief. "The plain words of the statute impose liability-whether in the form of payment of redressive damages or being placed under an injunction-only for conduct which 'subjects, or
causes to be subjected' the complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws."
Id. at 370-71. Cf Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14
(1977) (consistent pattern of official racial discrimination is not a prerequisite to showing an equal protection
violation).
62 Section 1983 relief was also denied because of the need for federalism and comity between the federal
and state governments. The concerns of federalism and comity have been the subject of extensive legal
writing. See, e.g.,Developments, supra note 2; Note, Rethinking FederalInjunctive ReliefAgainst Police Abuse: Picking
Up the PiecesAfterRizzo v. Goode, 7 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 530 (1976). See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
499-504 (1974) (White, J.).
63 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974).
64 436 U.S. at 691.
65 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
66 S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rae. S201-05 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), amended and reintroduced Amend. No. 1426, § 2(c)(2), 123 CoNG. REc. S16,560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977). The Justice
Department critique of the Bill also pointed out the anomaly of having varying standards for damage and injunctive remedies. Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 59-60 (prepared statement of Drew S. Days III, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice).
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2. Respondeat Superior
In order to determine the proper scope of state or municipal liability, entity immunity must be viewed in light of the compensatory and deterrent purposes of section 1983. Both current law under Monell and the Bill raise questions concerning the extent to which the government-employer should be liable
for the acts of its agents solely on the basis of the employer-employee relationship. Respondeat superior is a common law doctrine which holds a master liable
for the unlawful conduct of his servant when the servant acts within the scope
of his employment. The employer is liable even though the specific act of the
servant was unauthorized.6 7 Respondeat superior can be used both to expose the
employer-entity to liability and to hold the immediate master-supervisor
liable. 68 Prior to Monell, plaintiffs attempted to bring actions against supervisory officials under the theory of respondeat superior in order to reach more
defendants. Courts, however, rejected the use of respondeat superior against
supervisory officials. 69 In a similar manner, Monell rejected the use of respondeat
70
superior as the sole basis for holding a municipality liable.
With the exception of a Burton situation, the delineated circumstances in
the Bill in which a government entity would be liable are not based upon a
respondeat superior theory. In lieu of this vicarious liability, the Bill designated
specific instances of municipal responsibility, thereby retaining sovereign immunity to a limited degree. Under this approach states and municipalities may
be able to escape damages purely because of their status as a branch of the
government. For example, a government entity would not be held liable for
random constitutional violations by its agents. Yet no corresponding protection
is given either the entity 7' or private corporations7 2 for common law actions.
One critic of the Bill emphasized this deficiency in the legislation. "The commentators unite in denouncing the immunity of public entities as irrational, absurd and a blot on our system ofjustice. This bill should abolish that immunity
''73
altogether rather than just partially eliminate it.
The Justice Department
strongly supported the expansion of the definition of "persons" under section
1983 for both damages and injunctive relief. 74 The Department hinted that in
fact the Bill did not go far enough in that it would not have clearly imposed
75
liability for a single unlawful act of an agent-officer of a government entity.
67

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

68

See Schirott & Drew, The Vicarious Liability of Public Officials Under the Civil RightsAct, 8 AKRON L. REv.

§ 219 (1958).

69 (1974).
69 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
70 436 U.S. at 691.
71 See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Jones v. State Highway
Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974); Merrill v.
City of Manchester, 332 A.2d 378 (N.H. 1974); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820
(1960); Oroz v. Board of City Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Wyo. 1978) (36 states have abolished immunity in some form).
72 See, e.g., Merrill v. City of Manchester, 332 A.2d 378 (N.H. 1974). Note also that while an employer
can escape liability if its employee acts outside the scope of his employment, an officer's conduct is "state action" even though it is not pursuant to official policy if it results in an unconstitutional violation. Monroe v.
Pape, 364 U.S. 167 (1961); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913).
73 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 451 (prepared statement of Prof. Don B. Kates, Jr.).
74 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 44 (testimony of Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division, Department of Justice).
75 Id. at 45 (dialogue between Senator Mathias and Drew S. Days III).

[Vol. 55:133]

NOTES

Justifications for immunity, such as fear of timid action, fear of vexatious
litigation, and fear of excessive liability are less compelling when dealing with
the liability of an entity rather than an individual.7 6 Further, policy justifications given by the Rizzo Court, such as the concern for federalism and comity
between federal and state courts, are insufficient to shield government entities
for three reasons. First, section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress broader powers to involve itself in state and local government than does
article I.77 Second, section 1983 does not deal with a taxing statute or the
regulation of commerce, but rather with fourteenth amendment guarantees of
personal liberty. These guarantees are of paramount importance in preserving
individual rights. It has been stated that congressional enforcement of constitutional rights is the essence of federalism.78 Third, Congress and the courts can
provide broad guidelines by which to prevent excessive interference. If
federalism is allowed to preclude a section 1983 remedy, the result will be that
government agents will be allowed to violate constitutional rights solely
79
because the act was in the name of the state or local government.
Despite the apparent rejection of vicarious liability in the Civil Rights Bill,
some commentators expressed a view that in practice the Bill would have incorporated respondeat superior liability to a large extent. The Justice Department,
for example, noted that the Bill might have allowed liability in many cases of
isolated illegal conduct. The Department indicated, for example, that police
departments often have a file on certain officers who have a history of illegal
conduct or brutality that could serve to extend liability to government
entities.8 0 It is also possible that the broad standard that would hold entities
liable when a supervisor knew or should have known of the illegal conduct may
effectively impose absolute liability upon the entities.8 1 Yet the language and
structure of the Civil Rights Bill clearly limit the instances when a municipality
would be liable. It would be unwise to conclude that the Bill would be interpreted so expansively as to allow for vicarious liability. If Congress wants to
use a vicarious liability standard, it should do so in direct language.

76 See text accompanying notes 26-38 supra.
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 5 reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." While state sovereignty is a limiting factor under article I powers,
see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment allows much
greater power over state activities. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (§5 of fourteenth amendment
is not subject to eleventh amendment prohibition).
78 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of 5 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people .... ). Developments, supra note 2, at 1361; Senate Hearings,
supra note 6, at 497 (prepared statement of Pamela S. Horowitz, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union).
79 Even lower courts have expressed frustration over the fact that Rizzo precludes an injunctive remedy
despite a pattern of illegal activity. See Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 931
(1977) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 495 (testimony of Frank
Askin, General Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). However, respondeatsuperior would be limited by
the scope of the officer's duty so that actions by an off-duty police officer would not expose the government
to liability. See Note, Damage Remedies Against MunicipalitiesFor ConstitutionalViolations, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 922,
955 (1976).
80 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 45 (testimony of Drew S.Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division, Department of Justice).
81 Id. at 117 (prepared statement of Hon. Rufus L. Edmisten, National Association of Attorneys
General).
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3. Damage v. Injunctive Relief
Coupled with the failure to incorporate a vicarious liability standard into
the Bill was the separate treatment of money damages from injunctive relief.
While section 1983 could achieve both compensation and deterrence without
identical criteria for damages and injunctions, distinct treatment of the
remedies is not necessary. Full compensation would call for a respondeat superior
standard so as to provide maximum monetary remedy for victims of isolated illegal conduct as well as for victims of an illegal policy or pattern of conduct.
The goal of maximum deterrence, however, does not require an injunction for
isolated illegal conduct. Only acts which are likely to be repeated call for injunctive relief.8 2 However, if an injunction were given in an instance when
there was little likelihood of repeated illegal conduct, no affirmative harm
would result. As a remedial device, there is no reason to limit injunctive relief
under section 1983.
The fear of excessive federal interference with state and local activities
83
under section 1983 was initially raised when injunctive relief was ordered.
Yet, the possibility of federal intrusion upon state and local governments is also
possible when monetary awards are allowed. 84 If a distinction between the
amount of interference by the federal government caused by an injunction as
opposed to that caused by damages can be made, it lies only in the breadth of
the remedy. Damage actions usually require payment to an isolated party. Injunctive relief sweeps across a wider path, and by an order for affirmative con85
duct it can affect both the daily routine and finances of the government entity.
Even this distinction, however, does not justify a limitation of relief. When the
fear of excessive involvement with state activity is balanced against the need for
federal intervention to protect constitutional rights, the conclusion may be
drawn that protected rights should be given priority.
Making protected rights a priority, however, does not tell the district court
how far it can go in shaping a damage or injunctive remedy. It would be impossible to draft an effective provision which could apply in every situation to
prevent courts from fashioning an overly intrusive remedy. There is no certain
test to preclude unnecessary federal interference. Instead, the legislative
history of any legislation should include an indication of Congress' respect for
the need for comity between the federal and state systems. The language of any
proposed legislation should be discretionary. This is unlike the Civil Rights Bill
86
which phrased the injunctive relief provision with mandatory language.
Discretionary language would allow a court to fashion the most appropriate
remedy with the least federal interference. Courts would be guided by the
82 See text accompanying notes 109-10 infra.
83 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
84 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
85 Levin, The Section 1983 MunicipalImmunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L. J. 1483, 1535-36 (1977). However, a
class action damage suit could also affect both the daily routine and finances of the government entity. See
generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
86 S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S201-05 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), amended and reintroduced Amend. No. 1426, 5 2(c)(2), 123 CONG. REC. S16,560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977), states that the
court "shall" direct adoption of disciplinary or other remedial measures by the government entity. This
compulsory language increases the likelihood of unnecessary interference with local activities.
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legislative history which would indicate that an excessive concern for
federalism is not to be used to interfere with remedies under section 1983.87
IV. Official Liability
A. Current law
1. Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 is the primary basis for imposing liability upon individual
state and local officials for unconstitutional conduct. 8 Individual officers have
been shielded, however, either in whole or in part from section 1983 liability
through absolute or qualified immunity.
The vast majority of executive officials, from governors89 to police
officers, 90 are protected under section 1983 by a sliding scale of qualified immunity. The general rule of section 1983 executive immunity was first articulated in Scheur v. Rhodes. 91
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope
of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they
reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
92
based.
In order to qualify for the protection of qualified immunity, the state officer must demonstrate both a good faith belief and reasonable grounds for the
belief that his actions were proper in light of the circumstances. In addition, it
93
must be shown that the officer acted within the course of "official conduct."
The reasonableness requirement was clarified soon after Scheur in Wood v.
Strickland,94 which held that an official would be responsible "if he knew or

87 The following language would serve to incorporate respondeat superiorinto § 1983 and provide equally
broad remedies for both damages and injunctions:
5 2(c) (1) A State, municipality or any unit of government or agency thereof shall be liable for
damages or other monetary relief for the conduct actionable under paragraph (a) of this section of
any officer, employer, or agent of, or any other person clothed with the authority of, such State,
municipality, or unit of government or agency thereof.
5 2(c) (2) A State, municipality or any unit of government or agency thereof shall be subject to
injunctive or declaratory relief when necessary to prevent the recurrence of such conduct and in
other cases when such relief is necessary and proper.
See also Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 67 (letter from Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Department ofJustice, to Hon. Howard M. Metzenbaum).
88 McCormack & Kirkpatrick, supra note 20.
89 Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
90 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
91 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2907 (1978), applies the Scheur standard to
suits brought directly under the Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
92 416 U.S. at 247.
93 Id. at 248.
94 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Wood dealt specifically with school discipline, but has since been expanded. See,
e.g., Protunier v. Navarette, 98 S.Ct. 855 (1978) (prison administrator); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975) (superintendent of a state hospital); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.),
cert.denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (police officer). See also Comment, Official Immunity From Damages in Section
1983 Suits: Wood v. Strickland, 56 ORE. L. REv. 124 (1977).
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reasonably should have known" that his action would cause an unconstitutional deprivation of the right of another.95
Under the varying immunity standard for public officials, as presented in
Scheur, an officer with broad discretion would be entitled to a correspondingly
broad grant of immunity. The requirement of both a subjective good faith and
an objective reasonable belief makes an official liable under section 1983 when
he acts with personal malice or is negligent.
2. Absolute Immunity
A grant of absolute immunity functions like a definitional exclusion of an
officer from the purview of section 1983 in that an officer with absolute immunity suffers ho liability. 96 Absolute immunity applies without regard to the
intent of the actor or the legality of his actions. 97 Currently, legislators, 98
judges, 99 and prosecutors in their judicial role' 0 0 have been awarded absolute
protection from suit. These three categories of government officers exercise the
broadest discretion of any state or local government officials. Conceptually, absolute immunity is the logical end of the Scheur sliding scale of immunity.
B. Legislative Reform
Two specific provisions of the Civil Rights Bill dealt with the immunities
of agents of a government entity. First, the Bill would have made supervisory
officers with command responsibility jointly and severally liable with the individual wrongdoer whenever the municipality would have also been liable.
In contrast to Rizzo v.Goode, '0' in which the Supreme Court refused to impose liability on supervisory officials wihout some kind of affirmative act on the
part of the supervisor, the Bill called for respondeat superior liability for supervisory officials in the four circumstances in which the entity would have been
liable. 10 2 Use of respondeat superior to hold the supervisor jointly and severally
liable with the agent tortfeasor is contrary to both the basic scheme of the
legislation and the common law refusal to hold government entities to respondeat
superiorliability. For example, a supervisory official would be responsible under
the strict wording of the Bill whenever an agent carried out an unconstitutional

95

420 U.S. at 322.
See text accompanying notes 14-25 supra.
97 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13; Jaffe, supra note 27, at 221; Note, Delimiting the Scope of
ProsecutorialImmunity From Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 173, 174 (1977).
98 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
99 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
100 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Lower courts have extended prosecutorial immunity to
other court officials such as parole and probation officers, Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F.
Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977), and court-appointed attorneys, Minns v.
Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977). Cf John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1973) (qualified immunity granted) (decided prior to Imbler). The Minns court granted absolute immunity on grounds of the need to attract good personnel and the unfettered discretion required for good
representation. See Cozansky & Kertz, PrivateLawyers' Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 24 EMORY L.J. 959
(1975); Annot., 36 A.L.R. Fed. 594 (1978).
101 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
102 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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policy or regulation. Yet the agent would be immune from suit as long as there3
10
was objective and subjective good faith as to the reasonableness of the policy.
The second provision of the Bill dealing with immunity and liability of
agents of a government entity dealt with the absolute immunity of a
prosecutor. Under the Bill, a prosecuting attorney would be liable for
monetary damages when: 1) the acts or omissions of the prosecutor in the
course of the prosecution violated the criminal defendant's rights to due process under the fifth or fourteenth amendment or would have violated the rights
if a conviction had occurred; 2) he knew or reasonably should have known that
his conduct deprived the defendant of due process; and, 3) his conduct consisted of suppressing, concealing, destroying, altering, or failing to make timely disclosure of evidence or investigative leads to evidence. The provision was
limited by a statement which disclaimed any effect on liability for acts outside
the prosecutor's function in a criminal proceeding or the liability of any individual other than the prosecuting attorney.104
C. Critique
1. Liability of Supervisory Officials
The anomaly of holding supervisors liable for the unconstitutional acts of
their agents when no fault can be attributed to the supervisor was quickly attacked by commentators of the legislation.10 5 One purpose of respondeat superior
is to allocate risk to the employer and the public at large. 106 The employer in
the public sector is not the supervisor but rather the state or municipality.
Therefore, respondeat superior is an inappropriate doctrine for binding supervisory public officials. 1 0 7 Also, respondeat superior need not be applied to supervisors in order to meet the compensatory and deterrent purposes of section
1983 as long as the governmental entity is responsible.
In many instances some sort of independent fault may be established on
the part of the supervisor. If a respondeat superior standard is applied to the
governmental entity, however, it is unnecessary and unfair to hold supervisory
officials liable absent some indication of involvement on their part. The goals of
section 1983 would still be met without imposing vicarious liability upon supervisors. Compensation would be provided by the government employer and
wrongdoer.1 08 Deterrence would be necessary only where there is some indication of fault or bad faith by the employee. If the supervisor has not been guilty
of neglect of duties or bad faith, a finding of liability would serve no deterrent
purpose.
103 Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
104 S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S201-05 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), amended and reintroduced Amend. No. 1426, § 2(e), 123 CoNe. Rac. S16,560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
105 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 62 (prepared statement of Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney
General, Department ofJustice); id. at 314 (prepared statement of Hon. Edward T. Gignoux, U.S. District
Judge, Judicial Conference of the United States); id. at 121 (prepared statement of Hon. LouisJ. Lefkowitz,
National Association of Attorneys General).
106 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, 5 69.
107 Schirott & Drew, supra note 68, at 70.
108 Theoretical arguments concerning compensation do not take into account the fact that individual
defendants in a 5 1983 action are often judgment-proof. See Kates & Kooba, supra note 34, at 136-37.
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The legislation, instead, should specify that omissions by the supervisors,
as occurred in Rizzo, would be actionable. It should establish clearly that
negligent failure to provide adequate selection, training or supervision of
10 9
employees is sufficient to subject supervisors to liability.
2. Liability of Officials with Qualified Immunity
With the exception of supervisory officials, the Bill would not have altered
any other official liability currently limited by qualified immunity. Continued
use of qualified immunity under the Scheur standard comports with the compensatory and deterrent purposes of section 1983. The objective and subjective
good faith requirements fulfill the deterrent potential of section 1983. Deterrence requires discouraging or inhibiting unlawful conduct by the officer. Both
malicious action and negligent action imply some control by the officer over his
actions. Such malicious or negligent conduct would result in a personal
damage action against the officer. The fear of damage suits would have some
deterrent effect. Injunctions, similarly, are effective only when the agent has
some control over his actions.
The use of qualified immunity, however, does not allow for compensation
for every victim of an unconstitutional deprivation Vnder section 1983. A
deprivation which was reasonable in light of the circumstances, but which
nonetheless deprived an individual of his constitutional rights would not be
compensated. The harm to the, victim, however, is of equal magnitude
regardless of the motivation of the perpetrator. Two alternatives are open to
Congress. First, it may determine that the need for compensation under section 1983 outweighs the detriment of imposing liability without subjective or
objective fault. To mandate compensation for every section 1983 violation
would impose an absolute liability standard upon the officer involved. Under
this first alternative, unless the legislature is willing to place an onerous burden
on public employees, compensation to some injured persons must be denied.
Under a second alternative, compensation and immunities could coexist.
The option is to provide, as did the Bill, that the immunity of the agent-officer
will not protect the municipality from suit. "t 0 This suggestion has generated
2
both praise"' and condemnation. "1
When an individual is granted immunity, there is usually some policy
reason for the protection. If that immunity is extended to the employer without
independent justification, the immunity of the employer derives from that of
the employee. This derivative immunity is not a new concept, and its denial is
not unknown to the law. In agency law, the principal does not have a defense
simply because the agent has an immunity from civil liability. 1 3 Immunity is
109 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 451 (prepared statement of Prof. Don B. Kates, Jr.).
110 S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S201-05 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), amended and reintroduced Amend. No. 1426, § 2(c)(1), 123 CONG. REC. S16,560-61 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
111 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 296 (prepared statement of Eric Schnapper, NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc.).
112 Id. at 358 (prepared statement of D. Lowell Jenson, California District Attorneys Association)
("the mind-boggling methodology of governmental entity liability set forth in sec. 2(d) (1) offends the common sense which should be part of any law...").
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 (1958).

[Vol. 55:133]

NOTES

awarded because of some need to protect the individual from exposure to civil
liability. Because the policy justification for immunity applies only to the individual awarded it, immunity is a nondelegable right. 114 Thus the employer
remains responsible under respondeat superior unless an independent immunity
exists for him. The fact that the employee is immune from suit does not deny
that a constitutional deprivation has occurred. 115 When policy prevents the individual government agent from being held personally liable, compensation
should come from the employer-municipality.
3. Prosecutorial Immunity and Officials with Absolute Immunity
Not surprisingly, the abrogation of absolute immunity for prosecutors and
the insertion of only a qualified immunity was severely criticized.1 16 The Bill
would not strip prosecutors of all protection but would expose them to liability
when the three specified conditions were met. 117 The effect of this proposal
would be to broaden the present constitutional protection afforded criminal
defendants by Brady v. Maryland 18 and United States v. Agurs. 119 Brady states that
suppression by the prosecution of material evidence which is favorable to the
defendant who has requested it violates due process irrespective of the good or
bad faith of the prosecution. Agurs clarified Brady in holding that the Constitution does not require the prosecution to disclose everything that might influence the jury. Agurs stated that "[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected
the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional
sense." 120 The legislation, however, would expand the concept of materiality
to encompass "investigative leads to evidence." This approach expands the
conclusion of Agurs and for purposes of section 1983 would result in increasing
the rights of a criminal defendant. The purpose of section 1983, as its words indicate, is to guarantee an individual protection against the "deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law." Section
1983, both in past interpretation and in all other facets of the Bill, has dealt
with the minimal guarantees of the Constitution and other laws. 1 21 Because inclusion of "investigative leads to evidence" is an attempt to expand a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights, this provision departs from the purpose of the
114 Id., Comment b: "Immunities, unlike privileges, are not delegable and are available as a defense only to persons who have them."
115 See, e.g., Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., 215 A.2d 427 (Del. 1965) (personal liability of the employee
is not the basis of the action but rather the agent's negligent performance of the employer's business);
Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 361
P.2d 64 (Ore. 1961); Freeland v. Freeland, 162 S.E.2d 922, 926 (W. Va. 1968) ("The tortious act remains;
only the remedy against the servant is denied."); Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 677 (1965).
116 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 62 (prepared statement of Drew S.Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department ofJustice); id. at 348-55 (testimony and prepared statement of Lee C. Falke, President-Elect, National District Attorneys Association); id. at 116-30 (prepared
statements of Hon. Rufus L. Edmisten, Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Hon. Robert F. Stephens, and Hon.
Evelle J. Younger, National Association of Attorneys General).
117 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
118 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
119 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Evidence clearly supportive of a claim of innocence must be given to the defendant even if not requested. Id. at 107.
120 Id. at 109-10.
121 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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Bill and of section 1983. If such a provision is desired, a substantive civil rights
statute would be much more appropriate.
Aside from tradition, t 22 the distinction used to support absolute as opposed to qualified immunity for prosecutors stems from the need for independent decision-making by officers with extensive discretion. 123 The discretion
exercised by the legislature and judiciary involves policymaking and rendering
judgments. On the other hand, the executive branch and its agents act primarily to enforce the policies and decisions of its coequal branches. Although
prosecutors are officers of the judiciary, they not only make policy decisions to
prosecute but also function as executive officials to enforce their decisions. A
judge who renders a judgment, a legislator who rejects a bill, and a prosecutor
who dismisses an action in lieu of prosecution all make decisions employing the
widest possible discretion. For these types of discretionary actions, absolute immunity should be preserved. 124 Of these three officers, only the prosecutor will
take on an executive function in proceeding with the mechanics of a prosecution. Suppression of evidence in the course of a criminal prosecution is not part
of the judicial discretion of whether to prosecute but is part of the act of
prosecution. Just as a police officer is subject to suit for unconstitutional conduct in the course of an arrest, so should the prosecutor
be liable for un25
constitutional conduct in the course of a prosecution.1
Individuals with absolute immunity are allowed to deprive others of constitutional rights without fear of personal liability from damage suits. Blatant
constitutional violations, however, may be subject to correction or deterrence
through other methods" 6 such as the supervisory controls of punishment by the
employer, reprimand, loss ofjob and criminal prosecutions. These methods offer some deterrence if the agent is aware of the consequences of his illegal conduct. In addition, legislative and judicial oversight and procedural constraints
offer limited assistance in preventing unconstitutional conduct. For example,
in many instances an unconstitutional action by a judge, prosecutor or
legislator may be overruled, reversed or declared unconstitutional by higher
courts. Judicial overview is effective when an unconstitutional conviction or
statute is prevented from taking effect. Judicial overview is, however, an ineffective compensatory device when an action is found unconstitutional after the
harm has been inflicted. For example, in Stump v. Sparkman"27 a determination
that the plaintiffs rights had been violated by a court order to have her sterilized was of little consolation to the plaintiff years after the sterilization.
Criminal laws, at least in theory, offer some deterrence of unconstitutional

122 See notes 26-27, 73 supra.
123 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 435 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
523 (1868).
124 Justice White, concurring in Imbler, noted that "[tjhere is no one to sue the prosecutor for an erroneous decision not to prosecute." 424 U.S. at 438.
125

See id. at 432.

126
127

Mashaw, supra note 29, at 23-26.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). See generally McCormack & Kirkpatrick, supra note 20, at

69-73; Note, Immunity of Federaland StateJudgesfrom Civil Suit - Time For a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 727 (1977); Note, Stump v. Sparkman: Judicial Immunity or ImperialJudiciary, 47 U. Mo.
K.C.L. REv. 81 (1978); 11 IND. L. REV. 489 (1978).
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activity. The criminal counterpart of section 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 242,' 2 8 provides for fines of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for not more than one year for
any person who willfully subjects another to an unconstitutional deprivation
29
under color of state law. Unfortunately, the statute has been rarely enforced. 1
The effect then, of retaining absolute immunity for certain officials, even
with the above mentioned checks on excessive abuse, will result in cases where
constitutional violations will go unremedied.
In the previous discussion of qualified immunity, it was suggested that the
means to obtain compensation for victims of unconstitutional violations was to
make the state or municipality liable even though the individual agent was immune. 130 This derivative liability is not advisable when applied to individuals
with broad discretionary functions. One purpose of retaining absolute immunity for individuals with a wide range of discretion was the fear that the imposition of liability would produce timid action by these individuals. As indicated
previously with respect to judges, prosecutors in their judicial function of determining whether to prosecute, and legislators, timid action by these officers is
more likely to produce greater societal harm than is timid action by officers
with less discretion. If officers with broad discretion require a flexible area
within which to function, a court proceeding on the issue of government liability might circumscribe legitimate areas of action. The fear of being secondguessed in the courtroom, even though the agents would not be personally
liable, would be significantly reduced, however, if the government were only
liable when the agent with broad discretion acted without subjective or objective good faith. The judge, prosecutor or legislator would know that as long as
he acted in good faith, he would not expose the municipality to liability. Making the municipality liable only when these agents did not meet a qualified im31
munity standard would allow many suits to be dismissed on the pleadings.1
There would remain an area where victims of unconstitutional activities
would have no compensation: when the judge, legislator or prosecutor acted
with both subjective and objective good faith. Judicial review would arrest the
harm in some cases and in other instances would keep the harm from being in128

18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976) reads:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any
inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than
$1000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
129 See generally United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (conspiracy by election officials to stuff
ballot box); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (election commissioner charged with altering
ballots and false counting); Picking v. Pennsylvania R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945) (§ 1983 must be construed as "in pari material" with 18 U.S.C. § 242); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
AMERICAN LAW DIVISION CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (Report U.S. No. 1, Aug. 19, 1958). Only one § 242 action
has been brought against a prosecutor. United States v. Hunter, 214 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1954); Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 66 (letter from Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Department ofJustice, to
Hon. Howard M. Metzenbaum).
130 See text accompanying notes 110-15 supra.
131 Qualified immunity, as opposed to absolute immunity, does not necessarily mean that the issues of
good faith and reasonable action must always proceed to trial. Plaintiff may be required to allege facts sufficient to raise the issues of good faith and reasonable action. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561, 567
(10th Cir. 1977); Oakley v. City of Pasadena, 535 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1976); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d
1271 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13.
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flicted at all. Some uncompensated individuals, however, will bear the burden
of society's need to have its officers with broad discretion function freely.
V. Conclusion
Section 1983 has the potential to be an effective statute for the compensation and deterrence of unconstitutional action under color of state law. The full
potential of section 1983, however, is limited by the immunities currently
awarded to defendants. Congressional action is necessary, therefore, to realize
the full compensation and deterrence possible under section 1983.
In the area of municipal and state liability, the government entity should
be liable for all constitutional deprivations caused by its agents with qualified
immunity under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This would bring government entities in line with private entities and would allow for maximum compensation for individuals harmed by government actions. It would also serve to
deter government agents through use of the injunctive power of the court.
In the area of official immunity, government officers currently protected
from personal liability by qualified immunity should continue to be protected.
Exposing such individuals to liability would have no deterrent effect when the
action was in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances. The compensatory goal of section 1983 would be fulfilled by refusing to extend the immunity of the individual agent to protect the government entity. When an unconstitutional deprivation has occurred, the government would continue to be
liable even though the agent is immune from personal liability. Supervisory officials should not be liable for acts of subordinates solely by use of respondeat
superior. They should, however, be liable if they are in any way responsible for
the constitutional violation.
The absolute immunity currently granted to legislators, judges and
prosecutors in their judicial role should continue. The broad immunity is commensurate with the broad discretion required by these government officials.
Prosecutors who withhold exculpatory evidence during the course of a
prosecution, however, are not acting in a quasi-judicial role but are functioning
as executive officers. For this reason, prosecutors should be liable to the extent
of other governmental officials when they unconstitutionally withhold exculpatory evidence. However, the constitutional right to have exculpatory
evidence revealed to a defendant should not be expanded in section 1983 to include access to "investigate leads to evidence."
Compensation for individuals who are deprived of constitutional rights by
officials with absolute immunity should come from the government entity. In
order to protect the wide discretion necessary for judges, legislators and
prosecutors in their judicial role, however, government entities should be liable
only when the agents demonstrate bad faith or unreasonable action. Conduct
by officials with absolute immunity which was undertaken in good faith and
which was reasonable under the circumstances, but was later adjudicated to
have caused an unconstitutional deprivation of a citizen's rights, would go uncompensated under section 1983.
Congress should indicate a serious commitment to the protection of rights
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guaranteed by our Constitution and laws. The suggestions outlined above
would allow section 1983 to become a truly effective statute. They would provide maximum compensation for victims of constitutional violations and optimum deterrence of unlawful conduct under color of state law.
Judith A. McMorrow

